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T. W. Schultz’s theory of entrepreneurship is among his least known, but most interesting, 
contributions. While entrepreneurship is increasingly recognized as an important for economic 
organization and development, it is not a major component of the economist’s day-to-day toolkit. 
This paper describes Schultz’s approach to entrepreneurship and compares it to other concepts of 
entrepreneurship in economics and management.  
Entrepreneurship and Economic Organization 
Because entrepreneurs in many ways personify market forces, one might expect them to be 
the central figures in economics. Similarly, because most entrepreneurial ventures somehow in-
volve a firm, entrepreneurship would seem to be a core element of the economics of organization 
(represented, for example, by Milgrom and Roberts). However, entrepreneurship has been 
largely neglected by modern economists. Entrepreneurship is invoked in an ad hoc fashion, when 
needed, to explain aspects of firm organization (Knight, 1921), economic development (Schum-
peter 1911), market dynamics (Kirzner 1973), and leadership (Witt, 1998). Moreover, while 
many business schools feature entrepreneurship curricula, the phenomenon under investigation is 
usually small-business management, the study of routine management tasks, relationships with 
venture capitalists and other sources of external finance, product development, marketing, and so 
on.  
In the academic management literature, entrepreneurship is often associated with boldness, 
daring, imagination, or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996). These accounts emphasize the personal, psychological characteristics of the 
entrepreneur. In this conception, entrepreneurship is not a necessary component of all human de-
cision-making, but a specialized activity that some individuals are particularly well-equipped to 
perform, and one that can presumably be hired on the market like any other consulting service. 
Another strand of literature, incorporating insights from economics, psychology, and sociology 
and leaning heavily on Max Weber, associates entrepreneurship with leadership (Witt, 1998). 
  1Entrepreneurs, in this view, specialize in communication—the ability to articulate a plan, a set of 
rules, or a broader vision, and impose it on others. The successful entrepreneur excels at commu-
nicating these models to others, who come to share the entrepreneur’s vision (and become his 
followers).  
While economists have not completely ignored the entrepreneur, there is little consensus 
about how entrepreneurship should be modeled and incorporated into economic theory. Indeed, 
the most important contributions to the economic theory of entrepreneurship have generally been 
viewed as interesting, but idiosyncratic insights that do not easily generalize to other contexts 
and economic problems. Schumpeter’s well-known concept of the entrepreneur as innovator is a 
prime example. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new combinations”— new products, 
production methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations—shaking the econ-
omy out of its previous equilibrium through a process Schumpeter termed “creative destruction.”  
Realizing that the entrepreneur has no place in the general-equilibrium system of Walras, 
Schumpeter (1911, 1939) gave the entrepreneur a role as the source of economic change. “[I]n 
capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price] competition which 
counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
supply, the new type of organization . . . competition which commands a decisive cost or quality 
advantage and which strikes not at the margins of profits and the outputs of existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 84). 
Schumpeter carefully distinguished entrepreneurs from capitalists. While entrepreneurs could 
be a managers or owners of firms, they are more likely to be independent contractors or crafts-
men. In Schumpeter’s conception, “people act as entrepreneurs only when they actually carry out 
new combinations, and lose the character of entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up their 
business, after which they settle down to running it as other people run their businesses” (Eke-
lund and Hébert, 1990, p. 569). Moreover, because Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is sui 
generis, independent of its environment, the nature and structure of the firm does not affect the 
level of entrepreneurship. Corporate R&D budgets, along with organizational structures that en-
  2courage managerial commitment to innovation (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994), have little to do with 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship per se.    
Kirzner’s (1973) concept of entrepreneurship as “alertness” to profit opportunities is another 
well-known economics approach. The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discovers a 
discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical case, the 
entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production process and steps in to fill this 
market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes not from following a well-specified 
maximization problem, but from having some insight that no one else has, a process that cannot 
be modeled as an optimization problem. As in Schumpeter’s vision, Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do 
not own capital; they need only be alert to profit opportunities. Because they own no assets, they 
bear no uncertainty, and hence cannot earn losses; failure to discover an existing profit opportu-
nity is the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur. For these reasons, the link between 
Kirznerian entrepreneurship and the theory of firm organization is weak. Owners, managers, em-
ployees, and independent contractors can all be alert to new profit opportunities; Kirzner’s entre-
preneur does not need a firm to exercise his function in the economy.  
An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that entrepreneurship consists of judgmental deci-
sion-making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision-
making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual out-
comes, is generally unknown (what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic 
risk). Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. Judgment must 
be exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures.  
Knight introduces judgment to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Entrepreneurship 
represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, 
accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, 1921, p. 311). In other words, there is no market for the 
judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore, exercising judgment requires the person with 
judgment to start a firm. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-making 
is ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources. An entrepreneur without capi-
tal goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur (Foss and Klein, 2005). 
  3Schultz’s Theory of Entrepreneurship: the Human-Capital Approach 
Schultz (1975, 1979, 1982), like Schumpeter, works in the Walrasian tradition. However, 
unlike Walras and Schumpeter, Schultz recognizes that markets do not automatically and instan-
taneously regain equilibrium following an exogenous shock. “[R]egaining equilibrium takes 
time, and how people proceed over time depends on their efficiency in responding to any given 
disequilibrium and on the costs and returns of the sequence of adjustments available to them” 
(Schultz 1975, p. 829). Surprisingly, economists have devoted little attention to this problem.
1 
Even Schumpeter, who saw economic progress as the result of disruptions to existing equilib-
rium states, assumed that equilibrium is quickly regained following such a disruption. Schultz, 
by contrast, took innovation as given, and focused on how economic agents adjust to exogenous 
shocks. An example is farmers in a developing economy. Such people must “deal with a se-
quence of changes in economic conditions, which are in general not of their own making because 
they originate mainly out of the activities of people other than farm people. For this reason, 
Schumpeter’s theory of economic development is far from sufficient to explain most of these 
changes” (Schultz 1975, p. 832). Moreover, the atomistic nature of agriculture and the unique 
aspects of farm production generate problems of collective action and by-product behavior (Ol-
son, 1971), making such adjustments lengthier. 
In Schultz’s formulation, entrepreneurship is the ability to adjust, or reallocate resources, in 
response to changing circumstances. As such, entrepreneurship is an aspect of all human behav-
ior, not a unique function performed by a class of specialists. “No matter what part of the econ-
omy is being investigated, we observe that people are consciously reallocating their resources in 
response to changes in economic conditions” (Schultz 1979, p. 2). Businessmen, farmers, 
housewives, students, and even university presidents, deans, and research directors make 
Schultz’s (1979) list of entrepreneurs.
2  
                                                 
1 Prominent exceptions include Arrow (1959), Fisher (1983), and Littlechild and Owen (1980). 
2 Holmes and Schmitz (2001), by contrast, develop a model inspired by Schultz in which a division of entrepreneu-
rial labor, with some individuals specializing in entrepreneurial action, emerges. 
  4Somewhat paradoxically, the degree to which entrepreneurship is manifested in a society is 
itself determined by supply and demand.
3 The demand for entrepreneurial services is given by 
the expected gains from adjusting one’s resources in the face of the disequilibrium, itself a func-
tion of some characteristics of that disequilibrium. The supply of entrepreneurial capacities is 
given by agents’ abilities to perceive and exploit opportunities. Like any economic good, entre-
preneurship is valuable and scarce (Schultz 1979, p. 6). Knight and Kirzner treat entrepreneur-
ship as “extra-economic,” meaning that it is the driving force behind the pricing process, but is 
not itself traded and priced on the market. Schultz (1979) insists that entrepreneurial ability, like 
other services available for hire, is a resource with a market price and quantity, though he did not 
develop this insight into a fully specified theory of the supply of and demand for entrepreneur-
ship. 
Schultz conceives entrepreneurial ability as a form of human capital. Like other forms of 
human capital, this ability can be increased through education, training, experience, health care, 
and so on. While education and other human-capital investments also lead to improvements in 
technical and allocative efficiency, Schultz argues that efficiency improvements cannot account 
for all of the effects of education on economic performance, particularly in agricultural commu-
nities during periods of modernization. Increased abilities to adjust to change, for instance by 
adopting new technology and organizational practices, explain at least part of the returns to edu-
cation. Moreover, an economy’s aggregate stock of entrepreneurial ability can also be increased 
by the immigration of people with particular entrepreneurial experiences and skills (presumably 
in response to increased opportunities for entrepreneurial gain). 
Discussion and Implications 
While Schultz’s human-capital approach to entrepreneurship has received little attention 
among economists, it offers several potential advantages over the better-known concepts of en-
trepreneurship mentioned above. First, Schultz’s approach offers more testable implications; for 
                                                 
3 The paradox is that the quantity of entrepreneurship—the ability to deal with disequilibria—is itself modeled as the 
equilibrium outcome of a supply-and-demand analysis! 
  5instance, he shows how background and environmental conditions can be used to derive a supply 
function for entrepreneurship (which Schumpeter explicitly frowned upon). Second, Schultz em-
phasizes the temporal aspect of entrepreneurial adjustment, particularly important for agricultural 
production in which temporal specificities loom large. Third, the concept of a market for entre-
preneurial services has rich implications for economic organization; for example, under what cir-
cumstances can resource owners hire out for entrepreneurial services, and when must they coor-
dinate their own adjustments to disequilibrium conditions? What kinds of contracts effectively 
govern the exchange of entrepreneurship? 
However, Schultz’s approach suffers from several weaknesses as well. Most important, 
Schultz does not really grapple with the implications of disequilibrium, but instead presents what 
is essentially an equilibrium model of technology adoption. It has long been recognized that 
technological innovations do not diffuse evenly throughout an economy, but instead are adopted 
at different rates in different markets. Rosenberg (1972) observes that “in the history of diffusion 
of many innovations, one cannot help being struck by two characteristics of the diffusion proc-
ess: its apparent overall slowness on the one hand, and the wide variations in the rates of accep-
tance of different inventions, on the other.” As modeled by Hall and Khan (2003), for example, 
an individual producer’s decision to adopt a new technology depends on the ratio of short-term 
transition costs (particularly learning) and the long-term benefits of using the superior method of 
production. When these future benefits are uncertain, and agents have different expectations 
about them, there is an option value to deferring the decision to adopt. Increased uncertainty and 
heterogeneity of expectations thus explains the variation in adoption rates across technologies 
and markets. 
Technological innovation can diffuse slowly and unevenly for other reasons. First, there is a 
need for complementary organizational structures. Chandler (1962, 1977) shows how the rise of 
large, vertically integrated industrial enterprises during the early twentieth century gave manu-
facturers the ability and incentives to develop and deploy new technologies. More recently, new 
information-management technologies (supply-chain management and distribution systems) 
  6have given power to large retailers, whose procurement systems drive the entire vertical process 
of production. Second, complementary marketing and branding strategies must be developed.
4
In short, especially when applied to his preferred example—agricultural producers’ responses 
to technological change—Schultz’s concept of entrepreneurship looks very much like conven-
tional equilibrium models of the diffusion of innovation. Thus, while Schultz shares with Knight 
and Kirzner (and, to a lesser degree, Schumpeter) a desire to go beyond comparative statics, to 
provide an economic role for human creativity, and to highlight the entrepreneurial aspect of all 
human behavior, his formal conception of entrepreneurship differs sharply from theirs. Knight, 
Schumpeter, and Kirzner view entrepreneurship as a phenomenon that cannot be understood as 
the result of an optimization problem.
5 Moreover, Schultz also portrays entrepreneurship as a 
relatively passive activity, a secondary response to exogenous changes in the economic environ-
ment, without explaining the drivers of these changes. Finally, Schultz cites the substantial litera-
ture documenting the returns to education and other forms of human capital as evidence for his 
concept of entrepreneurship. But it is not clear that these returns derive from the ability to deal 
with disequilibria, rather than simply greater efficiency at predefined tasks. 
Still, the human-capital approach to entrepreneurship holds considerable promise for students 
of economic organization and development, particularly in agriculture, the industry Schultz knew 
best. This paper provides only a preliminary, exploratory sketch of Schultz’s ideas on this sub-
ject. While Schultz penned many lines on human capital, he explicitly compares his approach to 
entrepreneurship with those of Knight, Schumpeter, and Kirzner in only a few papers (particu-
larly Schultz 1975, 1979, 1980). We look forward to future work providing a more comprehen-
sive assessment of these important contributions. 
 
                                                 
4 For more on the adoption of organizational innovation, particularly in agriculture, see James, Klein, and Sykuta, 
2005. 
5 Kirzner, for example, explicitly distinguishes his entrepreneurs from what he calls “Robbinsian maximizers,” 
agents whose behavior can be explained using the standard tools of constrained maximization. For more on Kirzner 
is this regard see Garrison (1995). 
  7References 
Arrow, K. “Toward a Theory of Price Adjustment.” In Moses Abramovitz et al., eds. The Allocation of 
Economic Resources: Essays in Honor of Bernard Francis Haley. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1959. 
Begley, T., and D. Boyd. “Psychological Characteristics Associated with Performance in Entrepreneurial 
Firms and Smaller Businesses.” J. Bus. Venturing 2 (1987): 79–93. 
Chandler, A.D., Jr. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1962. 
Chandler, A.D., Jr. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Chandler, G.N., and E. Jansen. “The Founder’s Self-Assessed Competence and Venture Performance.” J. 
Bus. Venturing 7 (1992): 223–36. 
Ekelund, R.B., Jr., and R.F. Hébert. A History of Economic Thought and Method, third edition. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. 
Fisher, F. M. Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983. 
Foss, N.J., and P.G. Klein. “Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: Any Gains from 
Trade?” In R. Agarwal, S.A. Alvarez, and O. Sorenson, eds. Handbook of Entrepreneurship Re-
search: Disciplinary Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. 
Garrison, R.W. “Equilibrium and Entrepreneurship.” Advances in Austrian Econ. 2 (1995): 67–78. 
Hall, B.H., and B. Khan. “Adoption of New Technology.” In D. Jones, ed. New Economy Handbook. 
New York: Elsevier, 2003. 
Holmes, T.J., and J.A. Schmitz, Jr. “A Theory of Entrepreneurship and Its Application to the Study of 
Business Transfers.” J. Pol. Econ. 98 (2001): 265–94. 
Hoskisson, R.E., and M.A. Hitt. Downscoping: How to Tame the Diversified Firm. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994. 
James, H.S., Jr., P.G. Klein, and M.E. Sykuta. “Markets, Contracts, or Integration? The Adoption, Diffu-
sion, and Evolution of Organizational Form,” Working paper, Contracting and Organizations Re-
search Institute, University of Missouri, 2005. 
Kirzner, I.M. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. 
Knight, F.H. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. New York: August M. Kelley, 1921. 
Littlechild, S.C., and G. Owen. “An Austrian Model of the Entrepreneurial Market Process.” J. Econ. 
Theory 23 (1980): 361–79. 
Lumpkin, G.T. and G.G. Dess. “Clarifying the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and Linking it to 
Performance.” Academy of Management Rev. 21 (1996): 135–72. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. Economics, Organization, and Management. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1992. 
Olson, M. Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Revised edition, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
Rosenberg, N. “Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology.” Explorations in Econ. Hist. 10, no. 1 
(1972): 3–33. 
  8Schultz, T.W. “The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria.” J. Econ. Lit. 13, no. 3 (September 
1975): 827–46. 
Schultz, T.W. “Concepts of Entrepreneurship and Agricultural Research.” Kaldor Memorial Lecture, 
Iowa State University, October 1979. 
Schultz, T.W. “Investment in Entrepreneurial Ability.” Scandinavian J. Econ. 82, no. 4 (1982): 437–48. 
Schumpeter, J.A. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Inter-
est, and the Business Cycle. Translated by Redvers Opie. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, [1911] 1934. 
Schumpeter, J.A. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist 
Process. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 
Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1942. 
Witt, U. “Imagination and Leadership: the Neglected Dimension of an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm.” 
J. Econ. Behav. and Org. 35 (1988): 161–77. 
  9